A SPAC holds its investors' money in a trust. Before it merges with a target, every public shareholder may ask for that money back at trust value, as long as they ask by a published deadline. The bet was that this deadline creates a burst of price-insensitive selling in the days before it, which a buyer could absorb and then see revert.
forced flow / calendar
SPAC redemption at trust value
The idea
How it was tested
No backtest. The entry test read real merger proxies filed on EDGAR between 2024 and 2026, looking for the clause that makes a shareholder redeem, and for the way redemption actually happens.
Where it died
Rejected on 2026-09-23, on two grounds, each sufficient alone. First, nobody is obliged. The proxies say that a shareholder who wishes to exercise redemption rights must demand them. Redemption is a choice, and a rational one: cash out at a known value. That is the opposite of forced flow.
Second, even an obliged redemption would not move the price. Shares are tendered to the transfer agent and paid from the trust. They are not sold in the market, so there is no trade to push the price anywhere. The mechanism had neither a forced party nor a market transaction.
The record
Thesis
Ahead of a SPAC merger vote, the trust must pay out trust value to every shareholder who elects redemption by a published deadline, which was expected to create price-insensitive selling before that date.
Gates
Why it died
What it taught
Verdict history
- 2026-09-23Rejected at the entry test — redemption is elective and off-market Rejected before testing